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Aristotle offers us no sustained account of civic 
friendship (πολιτική φιλία), only remarks scattered throughout 
the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.1 In this paper I 
hope to make clear what his views on civic friendship are.
Before I get to his remarks on civic friendship 
themselves, I want to look briefly at two discussions in 
Aristotle that I believe contribute to uncovering his views on 
civic friendship, and I want to indicate briefly those 
interpretations of Aristotle's civic friendship that I reject.
I
First, let us take a quick look at two related issues: 
(1) Aristotle's criticism of the communism of women and children 
in Plato's Republic, and (2) Aristotle's claim that one cannot 
properly be a friend— i.e. a character friend— to many people.2
According to Plato, nearly every citizen in the best 
city of the Republic will actually feel close familial friendship 
or affection towards one another: A citizen will regard all 
younger citizens as children, and all older ones as parents and 
grandparents, and all those of the same age as siblings. And they 
will really feel this; these are not simply words (Rep. 463c-d). 
This, it was claimed, will result in the highest unity possible. 
(See Rep. 462b-464d.)3 Aristotle levels several criticisms 
against this 'communism of women and children,' as it is 
sometimes called. (See Pol. II 3-4.) For example:
What is common to the most people gets the least care, since 
they are concerned (φροντίζουσιV) most of all with their own 
things, but less with the common things, or [only with] as 
much as falls to each [individually] (1261b33-35).
And:
There comes to be a thousand sons to each of the citizens, 
and these not as [sons] of each [individually], but any 
chance man is equally the son of any chance man [given that 
they are in the proper age groups], such that all [the 
"fathers"] will eaually neglect them [i.e. the "sons"] 
(1261b38-1262al).
The main thrust of Aristotle's complaint is that where women and 
children are held in common (or more accurately, where all regard 
themselves as part of one common family) , people will not be able 1
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to oare for one another, and will not be able to feel close 
affection— at least not for everyone in the city. (See Pol. 
1261b32-1262al4.) Under such a system, friendship becomes 
fragmented or diluted, because fellow-citizens cannot spread 
themselves so thin without the affection becoming diluted or 
fragmented, and thus destroyed. (Pol. 1262bl4-22)
In a similar spirit, Aristotle claims that one cannot 
be a character friend to many people at the same time (NE 
1158al0-ll, 1171al-ll).5 Why?
1. The formation of Character friendships is not consistent 
with having many such friends. Character friendship 'will 
not arise among many people, because it is difficult to put 
many people to the test; for it would be necessary to live 
with each one' (EE 1237b34-36). (See also NE 1156b24-32, 
1158al0-15, 1157a20-25, 1161b24-27, EE 1237bl0-12.)6
2. Likewise, the activity of character friendship is not 
possible in relation to many people at the same time (EE 
1238a8-10). 'One cannot live with many people and distribute 
(διανέμειν) oneself among them' (NE H7la2-4), i.e. one 
cannot engage in the activities appropriate to character 
friendship with many people.7
It is impossible to know many people intimately, and it is 
impossible to act as a close friend towards many people. The 
knowledge, and the ability to act, involved in such a close 
relationship can be focused only on a very few people.
II
I think it is clear from what has been said that civic 
friendship cannot be equated with, nor is it a type of, character 
friendship. It is true that the Greek polis is much smaller than 
the modern state (and the modern city, for that matter) ; but no 
matter how small the population of the polis is, it will be a 
much larger number than the few character friendships that are 
possible. (As we shall see, Aristotle says as much.)
Terry Irwin, in 'Aristotle on the Good of Political 
Activity', recognizes that civic friendship is in some sense a 
form of friendship of utility, but he argues that because this 
does not show what is intrinsically good about political 
activity— and he thinks there are good reasons for believing that 
Aristotle thinks political activity has some intrinsic value— we 
must turn to character friendship in describing the relationship 
between fellow-citizens. This is hopeless, Irwin notes 
(recognizing that one cannot have many friends in the manner of 
character friendship), but not a waste of time. He thus extends 
civic friendship to include aspects of character friendship (e.g. 
we will regard fellow-citizens as other selves).8 But this is 
highly speculative, and quite dubious in light of Aristotle's 
criticism of Plato in Pol. II 3-4. 2
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?• Similarly, it seems equally clear that Aristotle's
criticism of Plato, as well as his account of character 
friendship, rule out any position that sees civic friendship in 
Aristotle as a relatively intimate relationship involving a close 
sharing or merging of the lives and· ends of the individual 
citizens.9 The stronger and more intimate civic friendship is, 
the more open it is to Aristotle's criticisms of Plato— i.e., 
attempting to make the affection that is felt between citizens as 
close as character friends would lead to neglect instead of 
affection, and such affection would end up fragmented and 
diluted. So civic friendship must be a weaker form of friendship 
than character friendship.
Does this mean that civic friendship must be construed 
in an extremely narrow way? Julia Annas thinks so. She rejects 
the view that there is 'a special sort of interest, which is a 
friendly interest on the part of each citizen in every other....' 
Instead she believes that
A civic or political friendship...is a friendship between 
two or a few more people whose shared activities are those 
of civic involvement, rather than those of religious, family 
or other involvement. They become friendships, presumably, 
because they are trying to support the same public measure, 
ostracize the same politician, and so on.10 
I believe three passages count strongly against Annas's view.
First, at NE 1167a22-b3, Aristotle equates Civic 
friendship with concord and says a city possesses concord when 
its citizens agree. Second, at EE 1242a6-9, he ties civic 
friendship to people coming together to form cities due to a lack 
of self-sufficiency and a desire to be in the company of other 
humans. Finally, at NE 1163b32-1164a2, civic friendship is said 
in part to involve the economic relations between, for example, 
shoemakers and weavers. These passages show that Aristotle's 
conception of civic friendship is broader than Annas claims, and 
broader in two ways: First, civic friendship involves many more 
people than the two or a few that Annas maintains it involves; 
and second, it does not simply rise out of an ad hoc political 
partnership with very narrow political aims. Civic friendship, I 
hope to show, involves many (ideally all) fellow-citizens, with 
an aim as broad as the good of the city and the citizens in it.
Ill
A person, Aristotle says, can be a friend to many 
people in a fellow-citizen's way.
Those who have many friends and treat them all as close to 
them seem to be friends to no one., except in the manner of 
fellow-citizens, and these people are called obsequious. Now 
it is possible to be a friend to many people in the manner 
of fellow-citizens and not to be obsequious, but a truly 
decent person. But it is not possible to be a friend to many 
due to their virtue and for their own sake, and we should be 
content to find even a few such friends. (NE 1171al3-20)
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Furthermore, civic friendship seems to be a genuine type of 
friendship. Specifically, it is a type of friendship of utility. 
'Civic friendship is constituted according to utility' (τά κατά 
χρήσιμον) (EE 1242a6-8). 'Concord appears to be civic friendship, 
just as it is said to be. For it is concerned with advantage 
(περί τα συμφέροντα) and with what affects our life' (NE I167b2- 
4). (See EE 1242a5-b26, and cf. EE 1236a33-34 and MM 1209bl7-19.) 
This should settle the debate over whether civic friendship is a 
form of character friendship or friendship of utility, although 
it certainly does not erase all the problems involved in 
discovering the exact nature of civic friendship.
So at the very least, civic friendship involves the 
feeling of goodwill by each citizen for every other (this is 
qualified somewhat below) , where all are aware of this good will, 
and where the source of (and the motivation for) this feeling is 
the expectation or recognition of the benefits they are receiving 
or will receive as a result of the relationship they have with 
their fellow-citizens.11 This does not mean they are 
indifferent as to whether or not their fellow-citizens also 
receive benefits. The goodwill they feel is genuine, and thus 
they wish their fellow-citizens well.12
In the Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle writes that civic 
friendship is not based on superiority, but on equality 
(1242a9-ll, b22, 30-31). This is not to say that there will not 
be a ruling and a ruled element among the citizens who feel civic 
friendship for one another. But what is important is that this 
ruling factor is not natural (φυσικόν, like the rule*of a master 
over a slave) or kingly (βασιλικόν), but based on equal rule in 
turn.13 So even if we are considering only the correct 
constitutions, we must set aside as special^ cases those not based 
on equality, i.e. on ruling and being ruled in turn. (This would 
include kingship and most forms of aristocracy).14 The 
important point here is that in most cases what fellow-citizens 
feel for one another (qua fellow-citizens) will be the same.15
The most important characteristic of civic friendship 
is unanimity or concord (όμόνοια) . Not only is concord a feature 
of civic friendship, Aristotle says it actually appears to be 
civic friendship (NE 1167b2-3, EE 1241a32-33). It also seems to 
be that which is most responsible for holding the city together 
(NE 1155a23-26). In addition:
Concord also appears to be a mark of friendship. Thus it is 
not merely identity of opinion (όμοδοχία), for this might 
occur even among people who do not know each other. Nor do 
we say that people are in concord when they agree about just 
anything, e.g. those who agree about the heavens (since 
concord about these things is not a mark of friendship) , but 
we say a city is in concord when [its citizens] agree about 
what is advantageous, choose the same actions, and act on 
what they have resolved to do in common. Thus, it is about 
things to be done that people are in concord, and among 
these, about important matters in which it is possible for
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' both parties or everyone to get what they want (NE 1167a22- 
30)
So civic friendship requires that citizens agree on what the 
proper conception of justice is, the arrangements concerning the 
rulers and the ruled, what offices should be elective, with whom 
the city should make an alliance, etc. (See Pol. 1301a35-39, NE 
1167a30-b2.)16 Citizens should in general agree on the most 
basic and most important questions concerning the nature and 
activities of their constitution. (See Pol. 1295bl3-33.) Also, 
citizens must be satisfied that there is justice in the city, not 
only politically, but economically (i.e. justice in the 
marketplace) . For instance, a shoemaker will have to know that he 
can deal with weavers, doctors, etc. and get a fair price for his 
goods, paying a fair price for their goods and services. (See NE 
1163b32-1164a2, EE 1242b21-27.) This requires a monetary system, 
a system of justice, no significant institutional fraud or 
corruption, etc. In addition, concord most likely requires that 
citizens be supportive of the constitution, that is, they must 
want it to exist, and they should feel benevolence towards it. 
(Pol. 1270b21-22, 1320al4-17)
Although Aristotle sometimes speaks of all citizens 
agreeing (e.g. Pol. 1320al4-17)— which seems quite unrealistic—  
he more likely means that all the parts of the city (especially 
rich, poor, and middle class) agree on fundamental constitutional 
issues (see Pol. 1270b20-22, cf. 1294b34-40 and 1295bl9-25)—
i.e., e.g., that the rich, for the most part, tend to agree with 
the middle-class. Even so, I imagine there are different degrees 
of concord a city could possess and still meet with Aristotle's 
approval, with the very unlikely total unanimity among citizens 
being at one end of the spectrum. More likely, there will be at 
least some locking of horns on fundamental political issues.
Moving on: Justice and friendship, Aristotle says, are 
either the same or not very far apart. (See ME 1159b25-1160a8, EE 
1234bl8-31.) All friendships of utility— and thus civic 
friendship— are most of all based on justice (EE 1242all-13) . But 
not all friendships of utility are the same.17 With respect to 
justice, there are two kinds of friendship of utility: legal and 
moral (νομική and ήθικη). The former is based on an agreement 
(καθ’ ομολογίαν) (e.g. on a contract), the latter is left up to 
trust, in a way that resembles character friendship. (He says 
this type tends to lead to accusations, and is contrary to 
nature.) (See EE 1242b21-1243bl4, cf. NE 1162b21-1163a23.)
Civic friendship, like the friendships found among 
cities in an alliance, are legal friendships of utility (EE 
1242b22-25). (This is, I think, yet another reason why we should 
not regard civic friendship as a form of character friendship.) 
But even within this category, there are differences in degree.
As we shall see, the friendship that exists among cities is an 
example of a stricter form of legal friendship. There are good 
reasons to think that civic friendship involves more than, or in 
some sense goes beyond, strict justice. Citizens should not
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simply be motivated by contracts or law, but also by a concern 
for moral character.
Pol. Ill 9 contains information crucial to 
understanding the nature of civic friendship.18 The city exists 
not only for the sake of living, but for the sake of living well 
(1280a31—32) . To put it another way, the city does not exist for 
the same reasons an alliance does, simply to prevent injustice, 
establish trade agreements, and make military treaties (1280a34- 
40, cf. NE 1157a27-28). It is necessary for a city to arrange for 
these things, but riot sufficient (1280b29-35).
Aristotle describes the major difference between a city 
and an alliance in the following way:
The city does not exist for the sake of an alliance, so that 
no one suffers injustice, nor for exchange and [commercial] 
dealings19.... Those in one city are not concerned that 
those in another ought to be of a certain quality, or that 
none of those coming under the treaty [or compact, τας 
συνθηκας] should be unjust or wicked in any way, but only 
that they should not act unjustly toward one another. But 
whoever is concerned about good government keeps an eye on 
political virtue and vice. It is therefore evident that 
virtue ought to be a care for every city that is truly (i.e. 
not just nominally) called a city. Otherwise the community 
becomes an alliance which differs from others (i.e. from 
alliances whose members are remote allies) only by location. 
And law becomes a treaty and, as the sophist Lycophron says, 
a guarantor among one another of the just things, but not 
that which makes the citizens good and just. (1280a34-bl2) 
Citizens (at any rate, some of them) must take thought for, or be 
concerned about, the moral character of other citizens. (In Pol. 
VII 4, Aristotle writes that citizens must be acquainted with 
[γνωρίζεΐν] one another's qualities or worth [1326bl4-16].) This 
makes a city one city (see Pol. 1280bl3-15) , and thus it may be a 
part of concord (which most of all holds a city together). In 
fact, concord requires at the very least the following concern 
for a fellow-citizen's moral character: One's beliefs about 
justice and the virtues generally will affect how one views the 
nature and activity of the city, and it is just such opinions 
that determine whether a city possesses concord. In addition, 
Aristotle says concord requires that citizens know each other, 
and he may very well have had in mind (at least in part) a 
knowledge of moral character, and thus it may very well be the 
case that Aristotle included this concern for the moral character 
of one's fellow-citizens in his conception of civic friendship.
A.W. Price claims that when Aristotle says a person 
wishes his fellow-citizens well and wants them to be good, this 
cannot mean that the person wants them to be good because it in 
some way benefits him. That, Price argues, wojild make the city no 
different from an alliance, where we are concerned that the other 
parties of the alliance are just only to the extent that it 
benefits us (or because it benefits us). Therefore, Price claims.
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Aristotle must mean that we wish fellow-citizens well for their 
own sake, which. Price infers, makes civic friendship a variety 
of character friendship: My goals— ray happiness— merge or 
'overlap' with the happiness of my fellow-citizens. Their 
happiness in some sense is a constituent of my happiness, as is 
true of character friendships.20
But what Price is offering us is a false alternative: 
Either the city is like an alliance in the way described, or 
fellow-citizens are intimately connected to a high degree, 
merging their goals arid lives together. But a distinct position 
between these two is possible (and much more plausible): A 
citizen is interested in the moral character of others not simply 
because he wants others to fulfill their contracts (though that 
is part of it) . He also wants his fellow-citizens to be good (and 
happy) because he spends a great deal of time with these people, 
and engages in activities with them— in the marketplace and at 
the Assembly, for example. But the source of this interest— and 
of civic friendship and the goodwill that that entails— is still 
utility, i.e. the fact that such a situation benefits me.
IV
So far we know that civic friendship involves citizens 
feeling mutual good will, a high degree of concord, a certain 
connection to legal justice, and (most likely) citizens taking 
thought for the moral character of their fellow-citizens. But we 
do not yet know how close this friendship is (if it can be called 
close at all). Discovering this, however, at first glance seems 
problematic. For on the one hand, we know from what was said 
earlier that civic friendship cannot depend on every citizen 
having a close relationship with each of his fellow-citizens (or 
even having knowledge of each particular fellow-citizen). On the 
other hand, we know that a citizen (in order to be a 'civic 
friend') must know the political views of his fellow-citizens (NE 
1167a23) and probably their moral character as well. Is there 
some way of resolving this apparent contradiction?
As far as I can tell, it can be avoided only if 
Aristotle maintains that a 'civic friend' knows in general the 
moral character of the citizen body (i.e., e.g., he knows his 
fellow-citizens tend to be just) as well as the general political 
views of the citizen body (i.e., e.g., he knows his 
fellow-citizens tend to be democratic, and for the most part 
believe the city should join in an alliance with Athens) .21 If 
one concludes that one's fellow-citizens tend to be moral, and 
observes that they tend to be in agreement politically, then the 
relationship one has with a fellow-citizen can be described as 
civic friendship. (No such relationship holds, of course, where 
one knows that a particular fellow-citizen is corrupt, say, 
and/or against the present constitution in some fundamental 
way.22) A citizen need only discover the character and 
political views of his fellow-citizens generally; a more intimate 
knowledge is not required.
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ΓHow will citizens come to have the knowledge requisite 
for civic friendship? Because of friendship, human beings desire 
to live together (Pol. 1280b38-39, and NE 1155al9-21) .23r This 
leads them to inhabit one location, intermarry, and partake in 
such institutions and activities as 'clans, festivals, and the 
pastimes of living together' (Pol. 1280b35-38). I believe Cooper 
is correct in writing that these clans, festivals, etc.
in turn...provide the specific sort of connectedness that, 
in Greek cities, grounds the interest in and concern by each 
citizen for the qualities of mind and character of his 
fellow-citizens generally that he has been insisting 
distinguishes citizenly ties from those provided by 
contractual agreements for mutual economic advantage.24 
These institutions and activities (in part) provide a citizen 
with both the knowledge of, and concern for, the ethical 
qualities of his fellow-citizens. In addition to these, political 
institutions and activities (e.g. meetings in the Assembly) also 
provide us with this same knowledge and concern, as well as a 
general knowledge of the (hopefully highly uniform) basic 
political views of the citizen body.
Citizens will feel affection for one another due to the 
mutual benefit they receive from living together in a city. They 
agree about what is advantageous for the city: who should rule, 
how the city should be run, etc.; and to the extent that they 
care about the common good, they all have one aim. In addition, 
the affection a citizen feels for his fellow-citizens most likely 
involves a concern for their moral character (and its 
improvement) . For how well one is able to support the city and 
the constitution, is likely to be loyal and not a traitor, is 
willing openly, honestly, and intelligently to discuss issues in 
the Assembly and the Council, is likely to be fair in the 
marketplace, etc. depends on moral character.
It is the awareness of a common aim and the awareness 
that everyone accepts it and is working to achieve it— each 
thereby benefiting himself25— manifested in and encouraged by 




1. Depending on how one reads Pol. l295b21-25,
Aristotle mentions civic friendship once or never in the 
Politics. (See John Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic 
Friendship,' in G. Patzig, ed. Aristoteles' “Politik11 [Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1990], 233-34nl6, and [in the same 
volume] Julia Annas, 'Comments on J. Cooper,' 246.) Though it is 
unclear to me why Aristotle has no discussion of civic friendship 
in the Politics, it is clear that what he says there is important 
for discovering his views on civic friendship. (On why there is 
little or no mention of civic friendship in the Politics, see 
Cooper, 234nl6, Annas, 243 & 248, and Suzanne Stern-Gillet, 
Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship [Albany: SUNY Press, 1995], 
204n7.)
2. I shall be presenting a paper entitled 'Aristotle's 
Criticism of Plato's Communism of Women and Children' at the 
Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association (Chicago, April 27, 1996) which will provide a more 
detailed look at my views on these two issues.
3. It seems that in this particular passage Plato has 
in mind the guardians alone, not all citizens. It also seems that 
Aristotle is aware of this (see Pol. 1262a40-bl). But on the 
question of whether Platonic communism is in general intended for 
all citizens or only the guardians, Aristotle thinks Plato is 
unclear, and there is something to what he says. (See my article, 
'Aristotle on the Extent of the Communism in Plato's Republic.' 
Ancient Philosophy 13 [1993], 313-21.) In any case, Aristotle 
proceeds as if this close familial affection were intended for 
all the citizens of the Republic.
4. All translations from the Greek are my own.
5. In Nicomachean Ethics VIII 2, Aristotle says that 
three kinds of things are likable: what is good, what is 
pleasant, and what is useful (NE 1155bl8-19). Friendship is not 
only goodwill (εϋνους, i.e. wishing goods to others for their own 
sake), it is reciprocal good will, of which both parties are 
aware (NE 1155b31-1156a5). (I take this, and not the list at the 
beginning of IX 4, as more of a description of the 
characteristics that every kind of friendship would possess. But 
cf. Annas, 'Comments on Cooper,' 235nl8.)
There are three kinds of friendship, he says, based on 
the three likable things (NE VIII 3, 1156a6-8). The first two are 
friendships based on utility, and friendships based on pleasure. 
These are the imperfect, or incomplete, types of friendship. They 
are coincidental (κατά συμβεβηκός, NE Il56al6-17): What is liked 
is not so much the friend's character, but the pleasure or
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*usefulness one receives from a friend. This is not to say 
Aristotle looks down on these types of friendship. They are 
classified as friendships because they resemble complete 
friendship. They are, however, easily dissolved, and they can 
exist among bad people. (NE 1156al0-b6)
The third type of friendship, complete or perfect 
(τελεία) friendship (what I shall be calling character 
friendship),
is the friendship of people who are good, and alike in 
virtue; for they wish goods to each other in the same way 
qua good, and they are good in themselves. And those who 
wish goods to their friends for the friends' sake are most 
of all friends; for they are this way [i.e. friends] because 
of the friends themselves, and not coincidentally. (NE 
1156b7-ll)
6. Cf. Theophrastus, frgs. 538a-f, where he says a 
person should make friends with people only after testing or 
judging them.
7. Living together involves shared activity. Aristotle
writes :
For each person, whatever existence [or being, τό είναι] or 
that for that sake of which he chooses to live (τδ ζην) is, 
that is what he wishes to do with his friends. Hence some 
friends drink together and some play dice, while others do 
gymnastics and go hunting, or study philosophy, each [set of 
friends] spending their days together engaged in whatever 
they love most in life. For since they wish to live with 
their friends, they do those actions and share in those 
things which they suppose make for living together. (NE 
1172al-8)
And perhaps most importantly, living together involves shared 
conversation and thought (κοινωνεΐν λόγων καί διανοίας, NE 
1170bl0-14). By spending time together, a good man perceives his 
friend and thereby perceives his own being, and this is pleasant 
and good (NE 1170al3-bl2, 1171b34-35). Such friends also 
cultivate virtue by living together (NE 1155al4-16, 1170all-13, 
1172al0-13).
When a friendship is a close one, as in the case of 
character friendship, then one friend actually feels the sorrow 
and joy of the other (at least to the extent that that is 
possible [EE 1240a33-b2] ) . And only in such a close relationship 
is a friend able to help another in bad times. 'For a friend 
comforts us by the sight of him and by his words, if he is 
dexterous (έπιδέξιος), since he knows (οΪδε) our character and 
what pleases and pains us' (NE 1171b2-4) . What makes this 
possible is the knowledge one character friend has of another— a 
knowledge gained through shared activity.
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8. Terry Irwin, 'The Good of Political Activity,' in 
Patzig, ed. Aristoteles' »Politik.1 87-95. Cf. Irwin, First 
Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), ch. 18. For others 
who believe civic friendship is in some sense a form of character 
friendship, see A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and 
Aristotle (Oxford, 1989), 193-205, and Paul Schollmeier, Other 
Selves: Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1994), ch. 5.
9. Again, I have in mind Irwin, Price, and Schollmeier. 
Certain elements of Cooper's view of civic friendship might 
arguably be included here as well.
As will become clear, I am in agreement with much of 
what Cooper says about civic friendship. Nevertheless, there are 
some points I am not sure about. For example, his view that civic 
friendship is an extension of familial friendship (236), his 
claim that the common advantage is greater than the advantage of 
the individual citizens (236), and most importantly, his claim 
that a non-virtuous citizen in a sense leads a virtuous life 'by 
having his life merged in the life of the whole city which itself 
is a virtuous one...' (240n22) . (On what Fred Miller has called 
Cooper's mix of holism and indivualism, see his Nature. Justice 
and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), 202-203.
10. J. Annas, 'Comments on Cooper,' 242, 243, 248. 
Miller, Nature. Justice and Rights. 207-209, seems to share this 
view.
11. This suggests that the deviant regimes (i.e. 
tyranny, oligarchy and democracy) will not be characterized by 
civic friendship in any essential or complete way. Certainly, 
there will exist no kind of friendship between the rulers and the 
ruled. For in these regimes the rulers do not care about the 
common good; they are only concerned about their own advantage. 
Rulers neither care about, nor act to benefit, the ruled. See 
Pol. Ill 7. Cf. Pol. 1309a33-35 and NE 1161a32-34. But there may 
exist civic friendship among the ruled.
12. Though I cannot get into the issue here, I should 
at least point out that I agree with Cooper's argument for the 
view that in friendships of utility and pleasure as well as in 
character friendships, one wishes one's friend well for the 
friend's sake. See John Cooper, 'Aristotle on Friendship,' in 
Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 308-315.
13. See EE 1242b27-30. I think it is clear that 
Aristotle is not refering to proportional equality, in the sense 
that, for example, a proportion may be found in the relationship 
between the king and his subjects that equalizes their 
relationship. See the next two notes.
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«14. See NE VIII 10-11. Consider the following example: 
In a kingship, there will be the normal civic friendship among 
the ruled, but what they feel for their king, and what their king 
feels for them, cannot be called civic friendship, for it is an 
unequal friendship, namely, paternal friendship (NE 1160b24-27, 
1161al0-15).
15. Even where equal citizens are ruled and rule in 
turn, there will be some differences in how the ruled treat the 
rulers. But these differences are minor. See Pol. 1259b7-8.
16. Perhaps the most important aspect of concord is 
agreement about the system of rule. 'There is concord when the 
same choice [has been made] concerning who is to rule and who is 
to be ruled.... Concord is civic friendship.' (EE 1241a30-33)
17. There are different types or degrees of friendship 
of utility. For example, the affection you feel for the doctor 
you have gone to for the past ten years will be greater than the 
affection you feel for your average fellow-citizen, though both 
are friendships of utility. And as we shall see, civic friendship 
will be greater than the friendship characteristic of alliances. 
Etc.
18. See Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic 
Friendship,' 229-232.
19. I follow Stalley in translating την χρήσιν προς 
άλληλους with '[comercial] dealings.' I believe it refers to 
other commercial transactions besides èxchange. Cf. Rep. 369b-c.
20. Price, Love and Friendship. 196-204.
21. Cf. Cooper, 'Political Animals,' 233-234nl6,
235nl8. Aristotle speaks of a citizen's goodwill for the city, 
and of cities in an alliance being friends (Pol. 1320al4-17 and 
NE 1157a25-28), so it is not implausible that he thought civic 
friendship involved a person feeling friendship for the citizen 
body as a whole.
22. Disagreements among citizens are of course bound to 
occur. (See Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: 
Community. Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 118- 
127.) Such disagreements may be what the author of the Maana 
Moralia has in mind when he writes that the friendship between a 
citizen and a foreigner is more solid than that between fellow- 
citizens (1211a6-16).
23. This is not civic friendship, but a more general 
form of friendship that arises among people of the same race or 
among human beings generally.
12
232-233.
24. Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship,'
25. The primary benefit is political stability— the 
city being held together. This best enables one to pursue one's 
own goals. There are other benefits of civic friendship, e.g. 
moral education. See Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic 
Friends,' 23 9n21.
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